Analysis On The Impact Of Us Tariff Policy On The Trade Performance Of Sme In China From The Perspective Of Asymmetric Game

Authors

Keywords:

Asymmetric games, United States tariff policy, SMEs, Export performance, Structural equation model

Abstract

Under the framework of asymmetric game theory, U.S. tariff policies exhibit the characteristics of "impact-transfer-differentiation" on China's small and medium-sized export enterprises. This paper takes China's export-oriented SMEs to the United States as research subjects, constructs a theoretical model of "tariff policy intensity (TAR) -tariff asymmetry (ASY) -trade flow (TRA) -export performance (EXP) -economic performance (ECO)" based on asymmetric game theory, and validates the model using SmartPLS through questionnaires from 51 SMEs across four provinces. The results reveal: 1) Tariff policy intensity (TAR) shows a significant direct positive impact on trade flow (TRA) and export performance (EXP), contradicting the initial negative hypothesis, which may stem from short-term cost transfer effects; 2) Export performance (EXP) serves as the core mediating factor for policy shock transmission, with short-chain mediation paths such as "ASY→EXP→ECO" and "TAR→EXP→ECO" showing significant and maximal effects, while trade flow (TRA) exhibits transmission failure due to insufficient supply chain resilience; 3) Tariff asymmetry (ASY) amplifies policy uncertainty to exert a significant negative mediating effect on export performance (EXP), but disrupts transmission to trade flow (TRA). Based on empirical conclusions, this study proposes optimization strategies from the SME perspective, including improving export pricing and customer structure, enhancing supply chain autonomy, and establishing tariff policy early warning mechanisms, providing references for SMEs to mitigate tariff impacts and enhance trade resilience.

Downloads

Published

2026-01-31